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PART II

Habeas Corpus as a Legal Remedy

Habeas corpus during the colonial and early national periods was
one strand in an overarching web of public and private legal remedies
restraining abuses of government power.
Chapter 4. To illustrate, I begin by telling the story of Captain Isaac
Hodsdon of the US Army, who was accused of wrongfully imprison
ing several men in Stewartstown, New Hampshire during the War of
1812. Their first resort was to obtain a writ of habeas corpus from a
state court. Hodsdon's response, that he would not produce the men
because one petitioner was a prisoner of war and so beyond the reach
of civil authority and that the other was detained on federal charges
and so not amenable to a state writ, was-quite appropriately-found
contemptuous. He was prosecuted for criminal contempt by the state in
an action controlled by the private parties concerned, and also held li
able for damages in a false imprisonment action. In the midst of all this,
the New Hampshire legislature (to whom Hodsdon apparently gave a
misleading account of the events) passed a bill to enable him to mount
a defense on the merits despite a missed deadline, and ultimately the
US Congress (to which his counsel had been elected in the meantime)
indemnified him.
The remaining chapters isolate the legal strands of Hodsdon's cat's
cradle as they existed during the colonial and early national periods. (I
mix the two periods freely because Independence did not change the
law in America on the subjects covered by this part of the text.) Where
Hodsdon saw a tangle of irritations, we should see a web of mutually
reinforcing legal restraints on government misconduct. Each had its
strengths and weaknesses. No one remedy worked perfectly all the time,
and sometimes no combination of remedies was efficacious. But just as
27
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part I showed that the first step toward getting an accurate view of ha
beas corpus is understanding it as only one of a variety of common law
writs that might secure an individual's release from imprisonment, so
this part will show that the second step is understanding it as only one
ofa variety oflegal mechanisms that might curb abusive government ac
tions. Habeas corpus was part ofa structure made sturdy by a redundant
design.
Chapter 5. Focusing primarily on some well-known cases arising dur
ing the War of 1812, this chapter illustrates both the power of the writ
and the long-recognized limits of that power. Those limits are the reason
that, then as now, one cannot assess a system for enforcing the rule of
law by looking at mechanisms in isolation but rather must consider how
well they work collectively.
Chapter 6. I next canvass private actions against public officials for
money damages. l!ntil the early nineteenth century, these actions pro
vided remedies for a broad range of government misconduct. Whether
or not to grant relief in any particular case depended critically on juries'
determinations of how culpable the officials had been. Thereafter, the
landscape changed radically, as the second half of chapter 9 describes.
Chapter 7. Another central strand in the web of restraints on power
comprised criminal actions against officeholders, both ones commenced
by private individuals and ones initiated by the government. The rela
tionship between the two has been contested for centuries and still is, as
the Supreme Court discovered in 2010 when it proved unable to decide
whether private criminal prosecutions are constitutional. Public crimi
nal prosecutions of wrongdoers are uncontroversial, ofcourse, but pub
lic resources are limited. Yet filling that gap by clothing private parties
with prosecutorial power opens many possibilities for abuse, as Captain
Hodsdon complained.
Chapter 8. The strands discussed in chapters 5-7 were elements of
an overall design. Parties who thought themselves abused by govern
ment could bring multiple legal actions to pursue their grievances, but
their targets could use the same actions for self-protection. The system
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was synergistic yet homeostatic. Few traces of it remain today, however,
because of the developments described at the end of the next chapter.
Chapter 9. Although formal habeas corpus proceedings did not in
volve juries, all the other actions described in this part did. This fact
is worth its own chapter because until the middle decades of the nine
teenth century the powers of jurors were extensive, encompassing the
right to decide the entire case, whether civil or criminal, in accordance
with their views of justice. Juries might allow judges to determine the
law, but could not be compelled to do so. More often than not, juries
in this system functioned with the reasonableness one would desire. In
routine cases involving technical legal issues, the jury would defer to
the court. In cases that conspicuously involved civil liberties issues or
in which the competing policy considerations were easily grasped (as in
cases involving misconduct by sheriffs, constables, and similar officers),
the jury would make its own decision.
Virtually none of this autonomy survives, having suffered three with
ering attacks: one early in the nineteenth century when the modern
boundaries between the branches were delineated; one around the Civil
War when congressional power to define the limits of official liability
grew significantly; and one in the last few decades, as the Supreme Court
has stepped in to create a series of legal barriers to protect officeholders
from ever having to face juries.
Chapter 10. Case-specific adjudication by legislatures is a Janus-faced
topic. Legislative action can sometimes achieve justice for individuals
when the courts have not. But it poses the risk of undermining judi
cial independence and uniform application of the laws. As the Supreme
Court showed in April 2016 when it divided sharply over the validity
of legislation giving victims of terrorist attacks access to funds that the
courts had denied them, both features of the topic deserve consider
ation. The discussion in this part focuses on the first, providing a num
ber of historical examples and highlighting the potentially positive role
of non-judicial actors in securing liberty. The negative aspects will be
discussed in part III.

4

Captain Hodsdon's Legal Entanglements

The War of 1812 was highly controversial domestically, especially in fed
eralist New England and particularly prior to April 1814-the period
during which the British blockade of the Atlantic Coast exempted ports
from Boston northward. One result was widespread smuggling between
New England and Canada. 1
On December 29, 1813, General Thomas H. Cushing of the US Army
wrote from his headquarters in Boston to Captain Isaac Hodsdon:2
Sir,
So soon as your company shall have been completed ... you will
march ... for Stewartstown, [N.H.] .... The object to be attained by an
establishment at Stewartstown ...is effectually to prevent any inter
course with the enemy. ... It is believed that by interesting the citizens,
friendly to the General Government, to watch and report to you, the
movements of the inhabitants on both sides of the line, and by sending
out small parties by day and by night to the principal roads leading to
the enemys country, from [the] Connecticut River to the settlements
along the northern boundary of New Hampshire, an effectual stop may
be put to all unlawful intercourse in that quarter....The act, laying
an Embargo' will justify you in stopping every person or thing which
you may find in motion for the enemys country and you will not fail to
make every exertion for carrying it into full and complete effect.4

Events from this point forward can be followed through two sources ,
that tell similar but not identical stories: legal filings of varying degrees
of plausibility and newspaper pieces in which the participants exchanged
sharply worded volleys. 5
30

CAPTAIN HODSDON's LEGAL ENTANGLEMENTS

I

31

Hodsdon and a party of troops arrived at Stewartstown, in the north
ern part of New Hampshire and close to its borders with Canada and
Vermont, on January 10, 1814. Thereupon, as he wrote to a newspaper
several months later, he "posted sentinels at the forks and angles of roads
for the purpose ofdetecting citizens who were in the nefarious practice
of smuggling."6 Hodsdon continued:
At the time of my arrival here, I was informed that Austin Bissel of Cole
brook, had recently conveyed a horse and sleigh into the province of
Lower Canada, and that he declared openly, that he would in defiance
of the laws of the United States, pass to and fro from Canada when he
pleased.... I thought it my duty to apprise him of the impropriety of his
behaviour and to state to him the consequences which would probably
attend a repetition of the same offence. I therefore on the 11th January
directed a sergeant and file of men to conduct him to the garrison. On
his arrival at the garrison I conversed with him on the subject of his hav
ing made these assertions, &c in the presence of his father and Joseph
Loomis, Esq.... and after receiving ... their joint assurance that ... Bis
sel would do nothing inconsistent with the laws of the United States he
returned to his home, not having been detained more than one hour at
the garrison, and that without any restraint.
On the 10th of Feb having obtained evidence that that Charles Hanson
of Canaan, Vt. was aiding and assisting in running property into Lower
Canada, I arrested him forthwith and transmitted to the District Attorney
the evidence against him, together with his situation.
And having obtained abundant respectable information which proved
that Sanders Welch Cooper in the employment of Herman Beach of Ca
naan [had been] running property across the lines to the enemy's terri
tory for five or six months past .. : I thought it proper to apprehend him
before he could pilot the enemy's forces into our territory ...His offences
were immediately reported to Titus Hutchinson, Esq. District Attorney
for the District of Vermont; and the said Cooper has been taken into cus
tody by the civil authority on a warrant predicated by the said Attorney.
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On or about the 10th of February, Charles Hall of Hereford, Lower
Canada, came to Stewartstown in the night [evading our patrols by taking
a] circuitous route through the snow where there was no road ... and
took up his residence at [a] house [that) has been a common receptacle
for Canadians and smugglers.7 Being apprised of Hall's situation, I have
secured him as a proper prisoner of war to the United States.8

On February 24, 1814, Herman Beech, Esq., presented to Justice Ar
thur Livermore of the New Hampshire Supreme Court an application
for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of Charles Hanson, Sanders Welch
Cooper, and Charles Hall, "all citizens of the United States" who had
"been arrested by persons claiming to act under the authority of the
President of the United States; and were being confined by Hodsdon
"without colour of authority:• The application sought a court order for
production of the petitioners "together with the time and causes of their
imprisonment on said writ returned before your honor that they be
dealt with as to law and justice appertains."9
In order to show that the three applicants were being held by Hods
don, counsel filed several supporting affidavits. The affidavit of Joseph
Loomis, a local judge, reported that he had been at the fort in January
"and there saw imprisoned Austin Bissell a private citizen of the United
States who has since been discharged:' 10 Loomis continued:
At that time I remonstrated with said Hodsdon against such unreason
able arrests. Said Hodsdon observed that he was acting under the author
ity of the United States and that he should continue to arrest all such
persons as said or did anything disrespectful to the army or the laws.
. . . [T]he conduct of those now commanding the military post at that
place is such as to make the civil wholly subservient to the military law
and unless suitable measures are taken to remedy the grievances of the
inhabitants of that part of the country many of the peaceable inhabitants
will be driven from their homes and be compelled to abandon their prop
erty to a lawless military force.11
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In response to the application, Justice Livermore on February 28 is
sued an order requiring Hodsdon to produce the prisoners by March 24
at the home of Colonel William Webster in Plymouth. 12 On the night
of March 3, Hodsdon moved Hall and Cooper to an army barracks in
Canaan, Vermont under the command of his subordinate, Lieutenant
Thomas Buckminster. 13
Hanson seems not to have been in Hodsdon's custody at the time. 14
Justice Livermore's order was served upon Hodsdon on March 4. In
the words of a witness:
[0]n the fourth day of March AD 1814 I called at Captain Isaac Hodsdons
quarters and asked him to take bonds for Charles Hall and Sanders Welch
Coopers appearance to any amount. He said no I cannot for I have had a
Writ of Habeas Corpus today ordering me to take them to Plymouth....
He then said that he should not take any council on the subject but con
sult his own fealings and make such returns as he thought proper. u
After considering the matter for some days, Hodsdon endorsed on the
writ:
Stewartstown NH March the 14th 1814
I hereby certify that the within named Charles Hanson, Charles Hall,
and Sanders Welch Cooper are not imprisoned or detained in my Cus
tody in the State of New Hampshire nor were they on the receipt of the
within Writ.
Isaac Hodsdon Captain 33d Regt. US Infantry 16
Perhaps realizing the vulnerability of this literally true but fundamen
tally evasive response,17 Hodsdon also wrote an accompanying letter to
Justice Livermore:
Sir, Enclosed is a writ commanding me to have before you on the twenty
fourth instant Charles Hanson Charles Hall and Sanders Welch Coo-
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per prisoners in my custody together with the time and cause of their
imprisonment alias confinement.
Charles Hanson of Canaan Vt.and the only person whom I ever
knew by that name is not a prisoner in the custody of any person.But is
about his ordinary business at home and elsewhere.
Charles Hall, of Hereford Lower Canada, now a prisoner of War in
the United States barracks at Canaan Vt.under command of Lieuten
ant Thomas Buckminster, will probably remain at that post until the
pleasure of the President of the United States is made known touching
that point.18
As the civil authority takes no cognizance of prisoners situate[d] like
him, I deem it inconsistent with my duty to deliver him into the hands
of a civil officer.
Sanders Welch Cooper of Canaan Vt. having been arrested and being
in confinement in a Guard house in said Canaan in possession of U.S.
troops under command of Lieutenant Buckminster under a charge of
furnishing provisions to the enemy. Supported by respectable testamony
[sic] and a statement of his crimes having been transmitted to Titus
Hutchinson District Attorney for the District of Vermont he has sent
his complaint and warrant to take him into custody. Your Honor will
therefore readily excuse me for not producing the prisoner agreeable to
the directions ofthe enclosed writ. 19

At this point, counsel for the petitioners sought and obtained from
the court an order requiring Hodsdon to show cause in Cheshire at the
beginning of May why he should not be held in contempt for having
failed to make "any legal and sufficient return" to the writ. 20 Hodsdon
responded by providing an affidavit stating
that being under necessity of repairing to Boston from Stewartstown
on public business he left said Stewartstown [and] on his journey ...
received ... a copy of an order of the Honorable Supreme Judicial Court
to appear before said Court at Cheshire on the first Tuesday of May next
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to shew cause why an attachment should not be awarded against him
for a contempt of and neglecting to make a legal return on a certain writ
of Habeas Corpus to him previously directed by the Honorable Arthur
Livermore one of the Justices of said Court. That he has no time or op
portunity to obtain evidence to appear at said court. But that he has im
portant and necessary testimony that he shall be able to procure by the
next term of the said Honorable Court and that he could not safely go
to trial without said testimony and writings, and that such is the great
necessity of the business which calls him to Boston, having commenced
the journey he is altogether unable to appear agreeably to the order of
the Honorable Court aforesaid and shew cause as aforesaid.21

What had so far been private civil contempt proceedings now became
private criminal contempt proceedings initiated by petitioners' attorneys
and captioned State v. Isaac Hodsdon. At the lawyers' request, the court
issued an order for Hodsdon's arrest. Directed to any sheriff or deputy
sheriff in the state, this order, known as a capias, recited the procedural
history and commanded the recipient to "apprehend the body of the said
Isaac Hodsdon ... and him safely keep ... to answer for said Contempt."22
Hodsdon was in fact taken into custody and, accompanied by counsel, ap
peared in August before a Justice of the Peace who took his recognizance
for an appearance at the September term of court in the amount of $500 as
well as that of a surety, Jacob M. Currier, in the same amount.23
In Hodsdon's account, he duiy appeared as required along with his
lawyer, John Holmes, who demanded a trial.24 Hodsdon continued that
the Attorney General had responded that
"although he was unapprized of the nature of the transaction out ofwhich
the prosecution originated and although it was commenced by some'pri
vate person, if the Court should be of an opinion that it was his duty, he
would pursue the prosecution:• And the answer from Judge Smith (who
was the only Judge on the bench) was that he did not consider that the
States Attorney was holden to pursue the prosecution. 25

36
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The case was, Hodsdon thought, then adjourned until February on
the same security. The clerk, however, recorded his appearance as being
due in November. 26 Hodsdon did not appear then, resulting in an order
forfeiting his and Currier's bonds. When Hodsdon got back to the court
to explain all this, it responded with an order to the effect that if he paid
costs and notified the private prosecutor, he would have his day in court
and a trial on the original cause of action as fully as if there had been no
default. However, Hodsdon maintained, being ignorant of the identities
of the private prosecutors he could not fulfill this condition, and execu
tion was issued against him and Currier for the $500 bonds.
Hodsdon sought relief from the New Hampshire legislature. Two as
pects of the long petition that he filed there are of particular interest:
(a) his questionable report of the relevant facts and (b) his attack on the
public-private enforcement framework in which he found himself.
(a) Hodsdon's letter to Justice Livermore replying to the writ of ha
beas corpus had reported with respect to Cooper that "a statement of his
crimes having been transmitted to Titus Hutchinson District Attorney
for the District of Vermont he has sent his complaint and warrant to take
him into custody." The transcription of this letter contained in Hods
don's petition to the legislature, however, rendered the last few words as
"complaint and warrant & taken him into custodY:' This is a difference of
some significance because if in fact Cooper had already been taken into
federal civil custody, Hodsdon would have had a much stronger excuse
for not producing him than simply the circumstance of his being wanted
for an appearance in federal court in Vermont, whether a warrant had
arrived or not. 27
(b) In addition to explaining his non-appearance as resulting from
confusion over court dates, Hodsdon ip his petition to the legislature
denounced the structure of the legal proceedings against him. The State,
he said, had accused him of an "offence of a public nature," and brought
him into court, where the State's attorney had declined to prosecute. But,
he continued, the court had stated that it could not dismiss the charges
because it "had not authority [nor was] at liberty to proceed, either to
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acquit or condemn the accused, until he himself should (if possible)
procure some private citizen to prosecute him;' and pursue or settle the
private contempt action.
Hodsdon called this "unprecedented in the Jurisprudence of every
other court, but that of New Hampshire for 1814 and 1815•... [Y]our pe
titioner is ignorant who the private prosecutor is, and if he could ascer
tain who he is, your petitioner would be compelled by the said decree to
pay him whatever sum his corrupt inclination might lead him to extort
from your petitioner, or not obtain the discharge aforesaid:' 28
Simultaneous with the filing of his petition, Hodsdon had one of his
lawyers, William Merchant Richardson (who had by now become Chief
Justice), write a letter to State Representative (later Congressman) Josiah
Butler, who had formerly clerked in Richardson's office. 29 Richardson
recounted in his letter that the habeas "application was made to Judge
Livermore ... not by the men arrested but by certain characters who
thought it not for their interest to have the intercourse with Canada
checked"; that he had suspected one Curtis Coe, an active Federalist, as
the private prosecutor in the criminal contempt action but had discov
ered this not to be the case; and that he still did not know the prosecu
tor's identity "but have understood it was one of Coe's associates in the
upper part of the state." In any event, Richardson continued, "I have
never doubted that [Hodsdon] intended to act honestly and justly, but
his situation was a difficult one. I was his counsel, but was so well con
vinced that his conduct was correct and his case was a hard one that I
have taken no fees nor do I ever intend to take any. I hope you will look
into his case and exert your self in his behalf as far as is proper:'30
On June 26, 1817, both Houses of the New Hampshire legislature
passed, and the governor signed, ''.An Act Granting Relief to Isaac Hods
don in Certain Proceedings had Before the Supreme Judicial Court:' 31
After a recitation of the procedural history, this enactment provided that
if Hodsdon appeared at the September term of Strafford Superior Court
and tendered security acceptable to the state's attorney for his contin
ued appearance "to answer for any contempt towards the late Supreme
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Judicial Courtt�2 the state's attorney was authorized to discharge Hods
don and Currier from their prior recognizances. No detailed account of
these proceedings has yet surfaced,33 but the two recognizances were in
fact discharged. 34
On January 31, 1822, Hodsdon signed a petition to Congress seeking
compensation for his expenses in connection with his various legal en
tanglements.35 In this document Hodsdon recounted that, in conformity
with his orders, he had
detected sundry persons who were furnishing the Enemy with Provi
sions ... some of whom being citizens of the United States were found
crossing into the Province ofLower Canada. These your petitioner caused
to be conducted from Lower Canada into the United States .... [Y]our
petitioner has been prosecuted in three separate actions for falsely im
prisoning those citizens who were found within the Province of Canada,
and were brought into the United States and were restrained of their lib
erty no longer than was necessary for that purpose.36 [Y]our petitioner
has been compelled to appear and answer from Court to Court ... for do
ing what he was ordered to do by his superior officer, and which ifhe had
omitted the doing of, would have rendered him obnoxious to martial law.

As to the three prisoners sought by the writ of habeas corpus, Hods
don wrote, one had been at liberty; one "was a prisoner of war and not
entitled to any benefit of such a writ:'37 and "one was in the Custody of the
Civil Authority of Vermont at the instance of the District Attorney on a
charge for furnishing the enemy with provisions:'38 None of the three, he
said, "were subjects of New Hampshire nor imprisoned within the State:'
Hodsdon accordingly sought reimbursement from "the Government of
the United States, the orders of whose officers he has strictly obeyed," for
his expenses "in defending himself in prosecutions brought against him
for doing a duty; which he was bound as a subordinate officer to do."
This petition in due course resulted in a report from the House Claims
Committee. 39 In addition to the legal proceedings already noted, this
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document reported that Cooper had recovere� a verdict against Hods
don in Vermont for $24.50 in damages and $35.84 in costs for causing
Cooper's arrest in the federal criminal proceedings,40 which were ulti
mately dropped.41 The committee also reported that on May 24, 1815, the
New Hampshire Supreme Court had ordered Hodsdon to pay Bissel a
fine of $50 and court costs of $18.92. 42 The committee noted that it had
obtained confirmation of the facts from "the Honorable John Holmes,
now of the Senate:'43 It continued:
The committee deem it unnecessary to enter into an argument to prove
that, where an officer of the Government, acting under its orders, in good
faith, has been subjected to the payment of money [ the officer] has a just
claim for indemnity; as this principle has been frequently recognized by
different committees, and in several acts of Congress.
The committee accordingly recommended that Congress pass a bill
compensating Hodsdon for the amounts assessed against him and the
costs of his defense in the various proceedings.
The committee's report sparked a fair amount of newspaper com
ment.44 A letter to the editor of the Concord Statesman & Register at
tacked the committee's conclusion that Hodsdon was entitled to be paid
both on principle and precedent, demanding to know why "the injured
and insulted people of the United States" should refund the penalties
imposed upon "this upstart tyrant" who considered "his epaulette and
sword to contain a charm of irresistible power over the civil law" and
"shut up republican citizens with ... as little ceremony as he would pen
his pigs?'45 The New-Hampshire Patriot responded that Hodsdon had
done "his duty in stopping and arresting traitors that were aiding the
public enemy:' and had been "illegally arrested and fined for executing
the orders of his superior officer, ...which orders were in conformity to
law and right:'46
In accordance with the committee's recommendation, Congress
passed a statute granting Hodsdon indemnification, which was paid.47

5

The Habeas Corpus Strand of Restraints on Government

A. The Power of the Writ
In response to the writ of habeas corpus that the New Hampshire court
had issued, Hodsdon should have appeared with his prisoners, asserted
whatever grounds he had to retain them in custody, allowed Justice
Livermore to conduct a factual investigation, and honored the resulting
judicial decision.
To be sure, Hodsdon might have found taking this course irksome. 1
But he would have been following the contemporaneous example of his
superior officer, General Thomas H. Cushing, whose directives Hodsdon
later claimed to have been obeying.2 In March 1814, Cushing received a
writ of habeas corpus from the Massachusetts Supreme Court ordering
him to produce a soldier named William Bull, who had allegedly been
enlisted in the army while underage. 3 General Cushing filed a return to
the writ explaining that Bull was in custody pursuant to the sentence
of a court martial that had convicted him of desertion, and personally
brought Bull before the court. The court heard full argument from coun
sel and, construing the relevant federal recruitment statutes,4 ordered
his discharge. Cases like this were common5 and regularly adjudicated
by the state courts. 6
In one well-known case during the War of 1812, General Morgan
Lewis, the commander of a key American military post, arrested a citi
zen named Samuel Stacy on suspicion of spying for the British. Lewis
ordered a subordinate to confine Stacy, planning to try him as a spy
before a court-martial.7 Lewis's response to a writ of habeas corpus from
the New York courts was that Stacy «is not in my custody." Chief Justice
Kent unsurprisingly considered this response "a contempt of the pro
cess:• inasmuch as Lewis had not (and could not have) stated that Stacy
40
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was not "in his possession custody or power:'8 The case, Kent wrote,
called for prompt initiation of contempt proceedings because a "mili
tary commander is here assuming criminal jurisdiction over a private
citizen ... and contemning the civil authority of the state." The Chief
Justice accordingly ordered that General Lewis be arrested for contempt
unless he either released Stacy or produced him in court in obedience
to the writ of habeas corpus.Stacy was thereupon released on the orders
of the Secretary of War, who had already concluded that the detention
was unjustifiable.9

B. The Limits of the Writ
Notwithstanding the brightness of habeas corpus in the historical con
stellation, nineteenth-century observers knew that its rays were not
strong enough by themselves to chase the shadow of unlawful impris
onments from Earth.
To take just one example, a nationally publicized episode originating
during the War of 1812 re-taught the enduring lesson that habeas corpus,
state or federal, was ultimately no stronger than the willingness of gov
ernment officials to honor it. 10
After arriving in New Orleans to take charge of its defense, General
Andrew Jackson on December 16, 1814 put the city under military gov
ernment. Following a series of engagements highlighted by the Ameri
can victory at the Battle of New Orleans on January 8, 1815, the British
withdrew on January 18. General Jackson's proclamation of martial law,
however, remained in effect week after week. The state militia remained
in service, the populace became restless, and General Jackson grew in
creasingly irritable while treating the city as a military camp that he
had the absolute power to control.He even issued an order to a local
newspaper on February 21 requiring it to receive official approval of its
reporting on the progress of peace negotiations.
Because foreign citizens were entitled to release from the militia, a
number of militiamen claimed (with a greater or lesser degree of accu-
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racy) to be French citizens and obtained certificates to that effect from
the French counsel Louis de Tousard; Jack.son responded by ordering
Tousard (who had fought for the Americans in the Revolution) and the
newly certified Frenchmen out of the city.
This measure led to an outraged letter to the editor of the Louisiana
Courier:
[W]e do not know any law authorizing General Jackson to apply to alien
friends a measure which the President of the United States himself has
only the right to adopt against alien enemies ... [I] t is time the citizens ac
cused of any crime should be rendered to their natural judges, and cease
to be brought before special or military tribunals, a kind of institution
held in abhorrence, even in absolute governments.11

Jack.son had his soldiers arrest the letter's author, a prominent legisla
tor named Louis Louaillier. As Louaillier was being seized, he called on
bystanders for support and one of them, a lawyer named Pierre L. Morel,
agreed to help him.
Morel first applied to Justice Francois-Xavier Martin of the Louisiana
Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus. Judge Martin, however, re
sponded, according to his own account, that the court
had determined in the preceding year ...that its jurisdiction being appel
late only, it could not issue the writ of habeas corpus. Morel was, therefore,
informed that the judge did not conceive he could interfere; especially as
it was alleged the prisoner was arrested and confined for trial, before a
court martial, under the authority of the United States. 12

Morel then approached US District Judge Dominick A. Hall "and
requested a writ of prohibition against Louailliet's court martial:' 13
Judge Hall, however, declined. 14 Morel soon returned with an applica
tion for a writ of habeas corpus on his client's behalf, and Judge Hall
ordered General Jack.son to produce Louaillier the following morning. 15
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But Morel promised Judge Hall that prior to formal service of the order,
he would inform General Jackson of it, and did so.16
Jackson exploded, arresting Judge Hall and confiscating the writ itself
from the hands of the court clerk who tried to serve it on him. The US
Attorney for the District of Louisiana, John Dick, then sought a writ of
habeas corpus on Hall's behalf from a state trial judge, who issued it.
Jackson refused to obey it and ordered the arrest of both the state judge
and Dick. The judge was not actually arrested, but Dick was. 17 Once it
became clear that a peace treaty had been signed, Jackson released all his
prisoners and discharged the militiamen from service.
When celebrations in the city had died down, Dick moved before
Judge Hall for an order requiring General Jackson to show cause why he
should not be held in contempt. This was granted, and Jackson appeared
in court. But the only defense forthcoming was a lengthy statement from
his attorneys discussing the perceived necessity of his actions; Jackson
himself refused to respond to a series of factual inquiries about his con
duct. The upshot was that Judge Hall fined Jackson $1,000, which he
paid, and that the Madison administration sent him a letter expressing
its concern. After that, the country's acclaim for the Hero of New Or
leans led to the matter fading into the background 18
Some decades later, when Jackson's finances were poor and his hero
ism firmly established in the public mind, his allies in Congress began a
movement to have his fine refunded; after an extended political debate
as to the propriety of his actions, this was done in 1844. 19

C. The Place of the Writ in the Web
The events recounted in this chapter took place at a time when legal
restraints on power formed a mutually reinforcing web. However sto
ried the reputation of habeas corpus might be, the remedy was useful in
some situations but not in others. The writ would not assist a prisoner
who was not present at the moment it was served on the jailer and it
might be defied or legislatively suspended. 20

44

I

THI! HABEAS CORPUS STRAND OP RESTRAINTS

But habeas corpus did not exist in isolation. It was supplemented by,
and often used in tandem with, many different sorts oflegal actions. For
example, in Hodsdon's case, prior to the service of the writ one of the
prisoners had been released (Bissell) and another spirited away (Coo
per). But both were able to recover money damages. 21
Notwithstanding the allure ofhabeas corpus as a subject for legal and
historical writing, it is only one strand ofthe mesh constraining govern
ment power by law.22 Assessing the system at any one moment requires
considering the entire lattice.

6

The Damages Actions Strands of Restraints on Government

One important section of the web of legal restraints on government
misconduct during the colonial and early national periods consisted of
private civil actions for damages. Such lawsuits, whether denominated
as false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, trespass, 1 negligence,
or otherwise, were a pervasive feature of the common law world in
the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 2 T he New Hampshire
archives alone provide ample material to illustrate the point.
A. The False Imprisonment Strand and Its Neighbors
A money damages action for false imprisonment might be the only rem
edy sought against the responsible officer. A straightforward instance
that can be reconstructed from scattered New Hampshire court files
is the lawsuit that Richard Sinkler brought against a J.P. named John
Tasker. 3 In October 1785, one Jacob Daniels commenced a criminal
prosecution against Sinkler for assault. 4 Tasker ordered Sinkler to find
sureties for his good behavior until trial, 5 but Sinkler, according to
Tasker, refused. 6 The upshot was that Tasker ordered the constable to
arrest Sinkler, who remained jailed for five days until eventually getting
bailed out.7 Sinkler sued Tasker for £200 in damages occasioned by the
five days of false imprisonment.
Tasker responded with a sham plea, 8 with the consequence that Sin
kler was awarded the £200 plus costs. 9 On Tasker's appeal, where the
action was tried for the first time, the jury awarded Sinkler £3 damages
plus £13. 9s.2d in costs; as far as the records reflect, he actually was able
to collect £9. 10
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Similar simple lawsuits might be brought against other officers. 11 For
example, during a clerical ordination service in South Hampton, New
Hampshire in February 1763, David Ring was allegedly harassing women
seated in their portion of a church-"hugging and squeezing them push
ing his hand around their necks and under their cloaks:' according to
one witness- and was accosted by constable Offin French on the orders
of magistrate John Page. 12 An altercation ensued in which, depending
on which account one believes, Ring either tendered sufficient money to
pay any fine or declared vociferously that he would neither pay nor be
placed in the stocks.13 This led, Ring claimed, to his being placed briefly
in the stocks and detained for several hours. It also led to a lawsuit by
Ring against both officers. 14 When this was initially tried, it led to a jury
verdict of £13.15s. against Page and nothing against French. 15 Page suc
cessfully appealed on procedural grounds and the case was remanded to
the trial court.16 There, Ring fixed the flaw and pushed ahead. This time
he recovered nothing at trial or on appeal, and the defendants eventually
collected court costs from him. 17
Sometimes the damages remedy for false imprisonment supple
mented the reliefthat the injured party had already obtained by securing
his release through other legal proceedings. Thus, for example, we saw
in chapter 2 (B) (i) that when J.P. Clement March secured the summary
incarceration of Peter Pearse for calling him a blockhead and rogue dur
ing an encounter on a Portsmouth, New Hampshire street corner in late
1769, Pearse gained his release within eight hours through certiorari
proceedings.18 After the underlying contempt proceedings had been
quashed without objection, Pearse brought a damages action against
March. The latter's init\al defense on legal grounds succeeded below but
was reversed on appeal. 19 On remand, the jury rendered a verdict for
March, but Pearse prevailed on appeal in September 1771, recovering a
jury verdict of £7 damages plus costs of £9.1os.20
In a similar case in 1770, a J.P. acting on the complaint of two towns
people of Chester, New Hampshire who were seeking to recover a
statutory bounty2 1 summarily incarcerated William Licht for harbor-
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ing a potentially indigent stranger. After being released on bail, Licht
succeeded in having the action terminated through certiorari proceed
ings.22 The following year he sued all three men for damages and recov
ered £6.1s. 23

B. The Negligence Strand and Its Neighbors
Improper official behavior was not confined to false imprisonments and
neither were damages actions.24
Thus, for example, in 176 6 Nathaniel Woodman of Salem, New
Hampshire found himself on the losing end of a lawsuit tried before a
Justice of the Peace named John Ober.25 Ordered to pay the plaintiff 20
shillings, Woodman requested an attested copy of the judgment in order
to take an appeal. But, Woodman complained, Ober, "contrary to his ...
office, oath and duty," refused to provide the document, thereby damag
ing Woodman to the tune of £10. Woodman recovered 5 shillings plus
court costs at the trial level, a sum increased to 30 shillings plus costs
when Ober appealed.
In a similar case in 1797, George Jaffrey had prevailed in a civil action
against George Fowler, who was imprisoned for failure to pay the judg
ment and held in custody by the jailer, Thomas Footman.26 But Foot
man, Jaffrey charged, "not regarding the duties ofhis said Office did not
safely keep [Fowler) as by law he was required but suffered and permit
ted him to escape;' losing Jaffrey the benefit of the judgment. Claiming
$200 in damages, Jaffrey sued Theophilus Dame, the county sheriff, who
"was and still is responsible" for Footman's doings in office.27 After a
sham defensive plea, the action was tried for the first time on appeal.
There, the issue was whether the release of Fowler had been with or
without Jaffrey's consent. The jury determined that issue in Jaffrey's
favor, and he was awarded $148.76 plus costs.
Because cases like this were common, 28 it is possible by looking at
verdicts to infer some of the distinctions being made by juries.29 Some
times these seem to have been based on what we would now call issues
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of fact (e.g., exercise of due care, causation). At other times, jury deci
sions on whether or not to impose liability seemingly turned on what we
would now call issues oflaw (e.g., official immunity for actions taken in
good faith, damages liability of superior officer for conduct of subordi
nate ["respondeat superior liability"]). 30 Until the developments of the
early nineteenth century that will be detailed in chapter 14 (B) below, the
difference between the two sorts of issues was of little practical signifi
cance. As more fully described in chapter 9 below, where the problem
presented was straightforward the jury simply applied its sense ofjustice
to the overall situation.
A trio ofNew Hampshire cases from the 1790s, for example, seems to
have revolved around issues ofdue care. In Larkin v. Reid31 and Gile v.
Hilton,32 a deputy sheriff apparently seized a wrong tract ofland.33 But
in both cases it is plausible on the facts that he was unaware ofthe true
ownership and in both cases the officer prevailed. On the other hand,
in Perley v. Webster,34 the plaintiff claimed that one of Sheriff Webster's
deputies had been ordered to make a pendente lite attachment and had
filed a return detailing the goods seized. But when Perley was granted
final judgment, the goods were nowhere to be found. Perhaps the deputy
never seized them or perhaps he converted them. But either way, as Per
ley saw it, the deputy's conduct was clearly culpable. The third jury to
hear the case agreed and awarded $150.00 in damages plus $181.01 in
costs.
Two case pairs, from before and after Independence, in lawsuits in
which plaintiffs sought to establish respondeat superior liability presum
ably reflect the degree of relative fault that the jurors decided should
be attributable to the superior and the subordinate under the circum
stances. 35 The colonial pair couples the 1759 case ofMonson v. Greley6
with the 1771 case ofPacker v. Renkin.37 In both instances deputy sheriffs
had executed judgments and pocketed the proceeds, resulting in law
suits against the sheriff as the party responsible for the conduct of his
subordinates. 38 The judgment creditor succeeded in the first lawsuit and
failed in the second. In the early national pair ofcases, George Reid, the

THE DAMAGES ACTIONS STRANDS OF RESTRAINTS

I

49

sheriff of New Hampshire's Rockingham County, was sued twice within
a few months because his deputies had failed to serve writs of execution,
thereby causing losses to the judgment creditors. On appeal, he won one
of the actions in early 1797 39 and lost one in late 1798.40
Reid was also sued around the same time in an action demonstrating
that the influence of statutes in routine damages cases against public
officials was peripheral to the point of invisibility. In Nason v. Reid,41
Shuah Nason alleged that Reid had permitted her judgment creditor,
the father of her illegitimate child, to escape from the jail to which he
had been confined for non-payment of his support obligations. The case
is thus just like several we have already seen in this chapter. In contrast
to the complaints in those cases, though, Nason's complaint cited a stat
ute-a lineal successor to one that had been in force for some So years
declaring that jailers were liable to judgment creditors for negligently
allowing incarcerated judgment debtors to escape.42 None of the other
plaintiffs had thought it worthwhile to cite the statute, although their
lawyers were surely aware of it.43 Nor did it seem to make the slightest
difference to the progress of this lawsuit. After a sham plea below, the
case went to a jury on appeal, which awarded Nason $100.87 of the $300
she had demanded, plus costs.
Statutes did, however, have a meaningful role to play in enabling
plaintiffs to seek designated penalties by suing public officials for par
ticular misconduct in office, e.g., charging higher than permissible fees
for serving a warrant.44
The overall result was that until the early nineteenth century there
was "little that one acting on behalf of the government could do without
rendering himselfliable to an action at law in the event that he wronged
another:'45

7

The Criminal Prosecution Strands of Restraints
on Government

As Hodsdon's saga in chapter

4 above illustrated, the legal restraints on
public power during the colonial and early national periods included
the liability of officeholders to criminal prosecutions, which could be
pursued both by private citizens and by public prosecutors.
A. Private Criminal Prosecutions
As will soon be evident, we do not yet have at hand any truly useful his

tory of private prosecution in America. Hence, I make no claim that the
particular procedures followed in Hodsdon's case were typical ones. But
his story does illuminate the power of private prosecution as a potential
check on government officials.
Hodsdon's predicament, quite apparent to all concerned, was that the
private prosecutor, not the government, had the power to drop the ac
tion. 1 The judge in Hodsdon's case specifically told the state's lawyer that
he was under no obligation to prosecute but told Hodsdon that he would
not be off the hook until the private prosecutor was satisfied. This aspect
of the matter was central to Hodsdon's complaint to the legislature. As
he put it, "a Sovereign and Independent State had accused an individual
with an offence of a public nature, and had prosecuted him for the al
leged offence, and brought him before the highest Judiciary Court in the
State, and ... yet they had not authority, or were not at liberty to pro
ceed, either to acquit, or condemn the accused, until he himself should
(if possible) procure some private citizen to prosecute him:' 2
Indeed, at just the same moment that the New Hampshire legislature
was lifting Hodsdon's default, the governor was asking it to reform the
50
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system of private prosecutions, complaining that the ability of the pri
vate prosecutor to drop (or, more importantly, not drop) the action left
the state in the position of having to pay costs:
Groundless, vexatious and trivial prosecutions, are sometimes com
menced and carried on in the name ofthe State, which subject the county
where they are prosecuted to the payment oflarge bills ofcost. In some of
these, the prosecutor makes use of the name of the State as an engine to
gratify his revenge on the accused, more than for the purpose ofconvict
ing and punishing those who have violated the laws.3

Although Hodsdon's situation at the time of his travails in New
Hampshire is clear enough, the story of the evolving relationship be
tween public and private prosecution on this side of the Atlantic,4 which
varied in the past between jurisdictions5 and which is still in transition,6
has not been told in any comprehensive and well-documented way, not
withstanding some initial efforts by academics7 and lawyers. 8
This gap in historical scholarship may well have had contemporary
consequences when the Supreme Court made its most recent foray into
the area in Robertson v. United States ex rel. Watson. 9 John Robertson
was convicted of criminal contempt arising out of his violation of an
order of protection that had been obtained in the District of Columbia
courts by his former girlfriend, Wykenna Watson, who initiated the con
tempt proceedings. Robertson had previously been prosecuted by the
government on assault charges, which resulted in a plea bargain that he
claimed precluded the prosecution brought by Watson. As the parties
saw it, the question turned on whether the current criminal contempt
prosecution was public (and therefore barred by Robertson's plea agree
ment with the government in the assault case) or private (and therefore
not binding on Watson). 10 The Court re-wrote the question presented
to address a broader issue, "Whether an action for criminal contempt in
a congressionally created court may constitutionally be brought in the
name and pursuant to the power of a private person, rather than in the

52

j

THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION STRANDS OP RESTRAINTS

name and pursuant to the power of the United States." The Court then
granted Robertson's certiorari petition, with the apparent intention of
answering the question "no:'
After oral argument, however, the Court dismissed the writ of cer
tiorari as improvidently granted, over a dissenting opinion by four
Justices who did want to answer the question that way. Of course, the
reasons for this disposition are purely speculative, but it may be that
one Justice (perhaps Justice Thomas) who originally voted to grant
certiorari concluded from the merits briefing that the original intent
was not as clear on a second look as it had appeared at first glance.
In any event, to the extent the majority perceived that the history of
private criminal prosecutions remains obscure, its perception was
correct.11 Notwithstanding some Justices' over-confident statements
of the known history both on oral argument 12 and in the dissenting
opinion, 13 " [a] lot of research remains to be done ... and the story is
on the whole rather murkY:>14
But we can make at least one observation of use for present purposes.
Doubtless the exercise of private control over a criminal prosecution
sometimes appeared, as indeed it did to Hodsdon, 15 less like a remedy
against oppression than an invitation to crush those against whom one
bore a grudge. 16 In fact, viewed as one strand in the overall web in which
it existed, it was not. As the next-chapter discusses, the remedy of pri
vate prosecution was itself subject to a meaningful check in the form
of an action for malicious prosecution by the wrongfully prosecuted
defendant. 17

B. Public Criminal Prosecutions
Our situation with respect to the public criminal prosecutions of office
holders is the opposite of the one just described. All we know about
Hodsdon's particular case is that the state's attorney declined to pursue
it. 18 But the overall history of public criminal prosecutions of officehold
ers is well-known: the practice was common and well-accepted. Having
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documented this point in detail elsewhere,19 I simply present here a few
examples involving conduct ofvarying degrees of culpability to illustrate
the point.
In a well-known English case dating from 1588, two London sheriffs
named Skynner and Catcher seized two respectable women on the street
and without benefit of any legal proceedings summarily imprisoned and
whipped them as prostitutes, with the result that one of the women mis
carried. The sheriffs were prosecuted by the attorney general, impris
oned, fined, and ordered to pay compensation. 20
Wyseman Claggett, a New Hampshire J.P.,21 was indicted in the mid
dle of 1762. The charge was that he had on December 3, 1761 signed a
judicial order known as a mittimus bearing the date of November 3,
1761 that ordered the detention of one James Dwyer of Portsmouth and
resulted in his imprisonment for 20 hours, after which, on December 4,
1761, Claggett did
wittingly, willingly, unlawfully and wickedly alter the said mittimus with
regard to the date thereof as to the month by erasing the word November
and interlining the word December in stead thereof and thereby made the
said mittimus a new mittimus against the peace of our Lord the King.2l
Claggett demurred to the indictment and the court quashed it, putting
an end to the criminal case.23 The disposition is unexplained but may
have been b�sed on the rationale that, on the pleaded facts, the change
merely corrected a prior error.24
In an 1800 case from North Carolina, Secretary of State James
Glasgow was indicted for fraudulently issuing a duplicate warrant for
land that was allocated to military veterans. One of his defenses was
"that no injury is stated to have ensued [from] the act of thus issuing the
duplicate:• Rejecting this, the court wrote:
[I]f a public officer, intrusted with definite powers to be exercised for
the benefit of the community, wickedly abuses or fraudulently exceeds
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them, he is punishable by indictment, although no injurious effect re
sults to an individual from his misconduct. The crime consists in the
public example, in perverting those powers to the purpose of fraud and
wrong, which were committed to him as instruments of benefit to the
citizens.... If to constitute an indictible misdemeanor a positive injury
to an individual must be stated and proved, all those cases must be blot
ted out of the penal code where attempts and conspiracies have been so
prosecuted.25

In a sensational case whose "legal proceedings ... fill almost an en
tire volume of State Trials,"26 General Thomas Picton, the first British
governor of Trinidad after its acquisition from Spain, was tried and
convicted in 1806 at King's Bench in London for ordering a young
native woman to be tortured to secure her confession to participation
in a robbery plot. Following a successful motion for a new trial, he
was tried again at King's Bench in 1808. This trial resulted in a special
verdict by the jury that because torture had been legal in Trinidad
at the cession of the island to Britain, Picton had behaved without
malice, even if illegally under the applicable British law. In an or
dinary case, a court presented with such a verdict would probably
have adjudged the defendant guilty while imposing only a nominal
punishment. But to have followed that course in this case might have
been seen as minimizing the seriousness of the offense. So the court,
while remitting Picton's recognizances, simply took no action on the
special verdict. Picton resumed his military career and ultimately died
at Waterloo.27
The control of officeholders' conduct might take place through their
prosecution not only for ordinary crimes28 but also for flagrant non
feasance 29 and for breaching duties imposed by regulatory statutes.
For example, a series of New Hampshire statutes dating back to the
1600s required the selectmen of towns of specified population to set
up grammar schools under pain of monetary penalty. In 1771, a grand
jury indicted the three selectmen of Chester for neglecting this duty,
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"contrary to the Law of this Province in that case made and provided:'
Two of the three selectmen appeared, went to a jury trial, were con
victed, and fined £10.30
As headlines show on a daily basis, the strand of restraints on power
comprising public criminal prosecutions against officeholders at all lev
els of government remains strong today.

